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Abstract
Recently, a curious illusion of absence has been described, where the space behind an occluder is
compellingly experienced as empty. This illusion is similar to illusions based on amodal completion
in the sense that it refers to occluded portions of a visual scene and informal observations suggest
that it may also be largely impervious to conscious knowledge. The aim of the present experiment
was to test the hypothesis that the illusion of absence is cognitively impenetrable in the same way
as amodal completion. Participants viewed magic tricks based on amodal completion, the illusion
of absence, or attentional and reasoning misdirection and tried to infer the secret behind the
tricks after one, two, or three presentations. The results show that the tricks based on the illusion
of absence are very difficult to debunk, even after repeated presentations. In this regard, they are
similar to tricks based on amodal completion but different from tricks based on attentional and
reasoning misdirection. The participants also rated how magical they felt the tricks were.
Surprisingly, the magic ratings tended to be quite high even in trials where the participants had
already discovered the secret behind the trick. This unexpected finding may be taken to suggest
that there may be two magical moments in the lifetime of a magic trick: In addition to the magical
experience evoked by trick itself, discovering the secret behind the trick may also evoke an
experience of impossibility.
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Magicians often create illusions where objects seemingly appear out of (or disappear into)
thin air. These illusions usually have simple explanations in which the object is hidden in a
location close to where the illusion took place. For an example, take a look at Movie 1.
Where do you think the apparently vanishing cigarette went? Most people will probably have
a hard time figuring out the secret behind this powerful trick, although it is disappointingly
simple: The cigarette was simply hidden behind the magician’s middle finger. This raises the
question of why it is so difficult to figure out this very simple secret. Ekroll et al. (2017) have
argued that many magic tricks, including this one, evoke a powerful perceptual illusion of
absence (“amodal absence”), where the space behind an object in the foreground (in this case
the middle finger) is automatically and compellingly experienced as empty. This illusion of
absence is nicely demonstrated in Figure 1A and B. Arguably, the notion of such a percep-
tual illusion where the space behind a finger may be automatically and compellingly expe-
rienced as empty makes it more readily understandable that people have trouble figuring out
the secret behind the above trick: Due to the powerful illusion, they fail to consider the
possibility that something could actually be hidden behind the finger.
The illusion of absence is reminiscent of the well-known phenomenon of amodal comple-
tion (Figure 1C and D) because it also refers to a curiously compelling experience of occlud-
ed regions in a visual scene. Amodal completion refers to experiences of complete objects
partially hidden behind an occluder, which are particularly compelling although only a few
fragments of the object are directly visible (Kanizsa, 1985; Michotte et al., 1964; Scherzer &
Faul, 2019; Thielen et al., 2019; Van Lier & Gerbino, 2015). Figure 1D, for instance, evokes a
very compelling experience of a single long finger, rather than the two separate fingers, which
are aligned behind the cylinder (Figure 1C). The phenomenon of amodal completion is of
great theoretical interest to perception science because it challenges naive intuitions about the
distinction between seeing and thinking. As it refers to occluded objects it would seem weird
to categorize it as a visual phenomenon, but on the other hand, it is very similar to visual
phenomena in other regards. In particular, as emphasized by several researchers (Ekroll,
Mertens, et al., 2018; Ekroll et al., 2016; Gerbino & Zabai, 2003; Kanizsa, 1985; Michotte
et al., 1964), illusions based on amodal completion tend to persist in spite of conflicting
conscious knowledge, in the same way as visual illusions at large. That is, they are cognitively
impenetrable (Firestone & Scholl, 2016; Pylyshyn, 1999).
In all models of amodal completion, visible fragments in the visual input form the basis
for some kind of perceptual extrapolation or “completion.” In the illusion of absence, how-
ever, there are no visible fragments that could function as “input” to these completion
mechanisms. Thus, although the illusion of absence is reminiscent of amodal completion,
Movie 1. A magic trick based on the illusion of absence.
2 i-Perception 11(3)
it is not readily explained within the same explanatory framework. One potential explanation
for the illusion of absence appeals to the principle of generic views (Albert, 2001; Albert &
Hoffman, 2000; Barnhart, 2010; Freeman, 1992; Koenderink & van Doorn, 1986).
According to this principle, the visual system avoids interpretations where small changes
in viewing direction would produce qualitative (topological) changes in the visual input.
Particularly for a small (or narrow) object in the foreground, this should make the visual
system avoid interpretations where anything is hidden behind it (Ekroll et al., 2017; Øhrn
et al., 2019).
The aim of this study was to investigate whether the illusion of absence is comparable to
amodal completion in the sense that it is driven by perceptual, cognitively impenetrable
mechanisms (Pylyshyn, 1999) as suggested by Ekroll et al. (2017). As argued by Ekroll,
De Bruyckere, et al. (2018), magic tricks may be expected to be very hard to debunk even
after repeated presentations, if they are based on cognitively impenetrable visual illusions. In
line with the notion that amodal completion is cognitively impenetrable, they found that
magic tricks based on it were indeed very difficult to debunk even after repeated presenta-
tions. They also investigated tricks based on various forms of attentional misdirection, and
here repeated presentations tended to make it much easier for the spectators to figure out the
secret behind the tricks. In this study, we replicated this experiment and also included tricks
based on the illusion of absence. Based on the hypothesis that the illusion of absence is driven
Figure 1. Top panels: Demonstration of the illusion of absence. Note how difficult it is to imagine that the
objects on the table (Panel A) are really hidden behind the violet “bubbled” occluder in Panel B. Bottom
panels: Demonstration of amodal completion. The two aligned fingers in Panel C are compellingly experi-
enced as a single long finger when they are partially occluded by the box (Panel D). Importantly, this strong
illusory impression is experienced even when you know that there are just two normal-length fingers. Top
row adapted from Ekroll et al. (2017, p. 98). Copyright (2017) by SAGE Publications. Reprinted with per-
mission. Bottom row adapted from Ekroll, De Bruyckere, et al. (2018, p. 3), used under CC BY.
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by cognitively impenetrable perceptual mechanisms, we predicted that also tricks based on
this illusion should be very difficult to debunk after repeated presentations. To anticipate,
our results suggest this is indeed the case.
Intuitively, it seems natural to assume that whenever the spectator is aware of the secret
behind a trick, she or he will not experience it as magical. Ekroll et al. (2017), however, have
argued that tricks based on cognitively impenetrable perceptual illusions may retain a certain
residual magical quality even after the secret is known because perceptual illusions tend to
persist even in the face of better knowledge. To elucidate this issue, we also asked the
participants to rate how magical they thought the trick was at each presentation. For the
tricks based on the illusion of absence and amodal completion, which by our hypothesis
depend on cognitively impenetrable perceptual mechanism (in contrast to the tricks based on
attentional and reasoning misdirection, henceforth “AR” tricks), we expected that the magic
ratings would depend less on whether the participant had figured out the secret or not.
Surprisingly, though, we found that the magic ratings for these two types of trick did not
decline at all after the participant had figured out the secrets. Also surprisingly, we found
that the decline after solution for AR tricks was relatively modest. We offer potential
explanations for this surprising finding in the discussion.
Methods
We performed an online experiment where the participants viewed movie clips of three kinds
of magic tricks, based on the illusion of absence, amodal completion, or attentional and
reasoning misdirection (“AR”). To examine how the probability that the spectators are able
to figure out the secret behind the trick changes with repeated presentations, each of the nine
tricks we used (three for each type, see Table 1 and the supplemental movies listed there) was
presented 3 times. After each presentation, the participants were asked to indicate (a) how
magical they thought the trick was (on a scale from 0 to 10) and (b) how they thought the
magic trick was performed. To control for previous knowledge about the secret behind the
tricks, the participants were asked—after the last presentation of each trick—to indicate
whether they knew the trick from before.
The tricks were presented in orders following the pattern (X1, Y1, Z1, X2, Y2, Z2, X3,
Y3, and Z3), where X, Y, and Z was a randomly chosen order of trick categories (e.g.,
X¼ completion, Y¼ absence, and Z¼ “AR”) and the numbers are those in the labels of the
tricks (Table 1). Thus, the presentation order of the tricks was fixed within each type of trick,
but the relative order of the three different trick categories was randomized. The experiment
was conducted with the online survey tool «SurveyXact» (https://www.surveyxact.com). On
the first page of the online survey form, the participants received general information about
the study (see Appendix A), and online informed consent was obtained by having a
final statement at the information page stating that the participant had read the information
and was consenting by going further in the survey. Before the main part of the survey
commenced, the participants were asked to indicate their age and gender as well as whether
they had any experience performing magic, and if so whether it was at an amateur or a
professional level. The magic tricks used in the video clips were performed by the first author
(M. S.).
Participants were recruited via a Facebook post on the web page of the University of
Bergen showing a video of a magic trick and a link to the survey. The post and the survey
were in Norwegian. A total of 518 persons clicked the link, but only 75 (46 females and 29
males, with a mean age of 33 and a standard deviation of 13.3) completed the survey. Eleven
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reported that they had experience performing magic at a professional level. Incomplete data
sets from 144 additional participants were not considered further.
The participants written responses regarding how the different magic tricks were per-
formed were coded by author M. S. and a student research assistant who was naive to the
purpose and hypotheses of the study. The magic tricks varied in complexity and therefore
had one to four theoretically based solution criteria, as described in Appendix B. In the data
analysis, we computed solution scores by averaging across the solution criteria. The study
was approved by the Norwegian Centre for Research Data (project number 56742).
In a previous similar study (Ekroll, De Bruyckere, et al., 2018), we obtained clear effects
with a sample size of 40 participants. Thus, we aimed for at least the same number of
participants. A few weeks after we announced the Facebook post it turned out that 75
participants had completed the study, and we regarded that as sufficient to proceed with
analysis. All measures, conditions, and data exclusions are reported in the “Results” section.
Results
Coding Scheme, Exclusion Criteria, and Preprocessing of Data
The correctness of the participants’ guesses about the secret behind each magic trick was
evaluated by author M. S. and a student research assistant who was naive regarding the
purpose and hypotheses of the study. Initially, we rated the solutions given by the participant
on a 4-point accuracy scale. The interrater agreement was surprisingly low (70%). This made
us realize that scoring the correctness of a given response was not quite straightforward for
some of the tricks because they involve several critical ingredients. Consider, for instance,
the rope trick (“Completion 1,” see Table 1 and Supplemental Movie 4). This trick involves
three different instances of amodal completion. Thus, it is not straightforward to decide
whether mentioning one, two, or all three should count as a solution of the trick. To address
this general problem, we developed a coding scheme with one to four specific criteria to be
used for each of the tricks. The coding instructions are listed in Appendix B. The overall
interrater agreement pooled across all single criteria was 93% (Cohen’s j¼ 0.80), between
author M. S. and a new naive rater. For each individual trial, we computed a solution score
by averaging the ratings (1 for correct and 0 for not correct) across both raters and all coding
criteria.
Whenever a participant knew the solution of a particular trick in advance, his or her
responses to that particular trick was excluded from further analysis. Thus, in 49 of a total of
675 possible cases (7.26%), all three responses of an observer to a given trick were excluded
(see Table 2 for a breakdown for the individual tricks). It sometimes happened that a par-
ticipant stated the right explanation of a given trick after the first or second presentation, but
stated another, wrong explanation at a later presentation. In these cases, it is reasonable to
assume that the participant already was aware of the right solution but still tried to find
alternative solutions. Therefore, whenever a participant’s solution score was lower at a later
Table 2. Number of Participants (Out of 75) Who Knew Each of the Tricks in Advance.
Trick type Absence Completion Attention/reasoning
Trick variant 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
Number of participants 5 3 4 7 2 13 3 5 7
% 6.7 4 5.3 9.3 2.7 17.3 4 6.7 9.3
6 i-Perception 11(3)
presentation of a given trick than at a previous presentation of the same trick, we adjusted
the later score to match the previous one.
Solution Scores
The average solution scores are plotted against the presentation number in Figure 2. As can
be seen, the tricks based on the illusion of absence and amodal completion have the lowest
solution scores across all three presentations. To quantify the statistical evidence for differ-
ences between the three kinds of tricks in the average solution score, we ran a Bayesian
mixed-model analysis of variance (ANOVA) (Morey et al., 2015) for each presentation time
and each pair of trick types (absence vs. completion, absence vs. AR, and completion vs. AR)
separately. The solution score was the independent variable, trick type was the fixed factor,
and subject was entered as a random factor. The resulting Bayes factors are listed in Table 3.
The Bayes factors BF10 obtained for all comparisons involving the AR tricks are (substan-
tially) larger than 100 and thus provide “decisive” evidence for a difference according to
Jeffrey’s terminology (Jarosz & Wiley, 2014, p. 8). Thus, we can be very confident that the
solution scores are higher for the AR tricks than any of the other two kinds of tricks. The
Bayes factors obtained for the comparisons between tricks based on the illusion of absence
and tricks based on amodal completion are smaller than 1 but larger than 1/3 and hence
provide “anecdotal” evidence against a difference (Jarosz & Wiley, 2014, p. 8).
The results plotted in Figure 2 also show that the change in solution scores from one
presentation to the next tends to be larger for the AR tricks than for the other two kinds of
tricks, particularly from Presentation 1 to Presentation 2. To quantify the statistical evidence
for differences between the three categories of trick with respect to the amount of change












































Figure 2. A: Average solution scores for the tricks plotted against how many times they had been viewed. B:
Same as (A) but averaged across tricks of the same category. AR¼ attentional and reasoning.
Table 3. Bayes Factors BF10 for Differences in Solution Scores Between Trick Types at Each of the Three
Presentation Times.
Comparison Presentation 1 Presentation 2 Presentation 3
AR versus absence 2.1eþ 17 7.6eþ 39 3.9eþ 52
AR versus completion 5.3eþ 11 1.8eþ 34 3.2eþ 44
Absence versus completion 0.35 0.35 0.96
Note. AR¼ attentional and reasoning.
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each pair of presentation times (1–2 and 2–3) and each pair of trick categories (absence vs.
completion, absence vs. AR, and completion vs. AR). The solution score was the indepen-
dent variable, trick type and presentation time were the fixed factors, and subject was entered
as a random factor. Table 4 lists the Bayes factors BF10 obtained for potential differences in
the amount of change (i.e., the interaction between trick category and presentation time).
Regarding the changes in solution scores from Presentation 1 to Presentation 2, there is
“decisive” evidence (Bayes factors larger than 100) that the change is larger for the AR trick
category than for any of the two other trick categories, and “substantial” evidence (a Bayes
factor less than 1/3 and larger than 1/10) against any difference in that change for the tricks
based on amodal absence and those based on amodal completion. From Presentation 2 to
Presentation 3, the Bayes factors are all less than 1, meaning that they provide evidence
against a difference. But note that the evidence against a difference in the change is only
“anecdotal” (between 1/3 and 1) when the AR tricks are compared with the absence tricks.
For the other two pairs of trick types, the evidence against a difference is “strong” (less than
1/3). Thus, in summary, we have clear evidence that the solution scores increase more for the
AR tricks than the other tricks from Presentation 1 to Presentation 2, but there is no evi-
dence for this from Presentation 2 to Presentation 3.
Magic Ratings
Figure 3 shows the mean magic ratings. The ratings were collected immediately after each
presentation of a trick and thus immediately before the participant was asked to report what
she or he thought may be the secret behind the trick. Panel A shows the mean ratings for
each trick separately, at each of the three presentations. Panel B shows the same data
Table 4. Bayes Factors BF10 for Differences in the Change in Solution Scores From One Presentation to the
Next, for All Three Pairs of Trick Categories.
Comparison
From Presentation
1 to Presentation 2
From Presentation
2 to Presentation 3
AR versus absence 5.2eþ 05 0.48
AR versus completion 8.3eþ 04 0.25
Absence versus completion 0.12 0.12









































Figure 3. A: Average magic ratings plotted against presentation number, plotted separately for each of the
nine tricks investigated. B: Same as in (A) but pooled across all tricks of the same type. AR¼ attentional and
reasoning.
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averaged across tricks of the same category. As can be seen in (A), the magic ratings decrease
with repeated presentations for all the individual tricks. The slope of the decrease is similar
for most of the tricks, except two of the AR tricks, where the drop from Presentation 1 to
Presentation 2 is somewhat steeper. On average, the tricks based on amodal completion have
the highest ratings, those based on amodal absence have intermediate ratings, and the AR
tricks have the lowest ratings. The decrease in the magic ratings with presentation number is
very similar for the tricks based on amodal completion and the tricks based on the illusion of
absence but somewhat larger for the AR tricks (Figure 3B). A Bayesian mixed-model
ANOVA (Morey et al., 2015) with the magic ratings as the independent variable, trick
category, and presentation number as fixed factors and subject as a random factor revealed
“decisive evidence” for a main effect of trick category (BF10¼ 2.4eþ 15), for a main effect of
presentation number (BF10¼ 4.4eþ 24), as well as for an interaction between these two
factors (BF10¼ 1,265). We also ran a Bayesian mixed-model ANOVA for each presentation
time and each pair of trick types (absence vs. completion, absence vs. AR and completion vs.
AR) separately. The magic rating was the independent variable, trick type was the fixed
factor, and subject was entered as a random factor. The resulting Bayes factors are listed in
Table 5. There was “decisive” evidence for the differences between the tricks based on
amodal completion and those based on the illusion of absence at all presentation times
(Bayes factors larger than 100). There was also “decisive” evidence for a difference between
the AR tricks and the amodal completion tricks at Presentation 2 and Presentation 3, but at
Presentation 1, there was “anecdotal” evidence against a difference. Finally, there was evi-
dence for a difference between the AR tricks and those based on the illusion of absence at all
presentations, but only “anecdotal” at Presentation 1, “substantial” at Presentation 2, and
“decisive” at Presentation 3.
To quantify the statistical evidence for differences between the three categories of trick
with respect to the amount of change with presentation number, we ran a Bayesian mixed-
model ANOVAs (Morey et al., 2015) for each pair of presentation times (1–2 and 2–3) and
each pair of trick categories (absence vs. completion, absence vs. AR, and completion vs.
AR). The magic rating was the independent variable, trick type and presentation time were
the fixed factors, and subject was entered as a random factor. Table 6 lists the Bayes factors
BF10 obtained for potential differences in the amount of change (i.e., the interaction between
trick category and presentation time). From Presentation 1 to Presentation 2, there is evi-
dence that the change is larger for the AR tricks than for either of the two other kinds of
tricks. This evidence is “decisive” (BF10> 100) for the comparison with the tricks based on
the illusion of absence “very strong” (BF10> 30) for the comparison with the tricks based on
amodal completion. In all other cases, there is “substantial” evidence against different
amounts of change (BF10< 1/3).
Table 5. Bayes Factors BF10 for Differences in Magic Ratings Between Trick Types at Each of the Three
Presentation Times.
Comparison Presentation 1 Presentation 2 Presentation 3
AR versus absence 2.82 3.68 720
AR versus completion 0.74 1.6eþ 7 8.6eþ 9
Absence versus completion 2,200 335 111
Note. AR¼ attentional and reasoning.
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Relationship Between the Solution Scores and the Magic Ratings
Intuitively, it seems reasonable to expect an inverse relationship between solution scores and
magic ratings because knowing the secret behind a trick can be expected to make it appear
less magical. On this view, one would expect that the pattern of solution scores in Figure 2B
should be qualitatively similar to the pattern of ratings in Figure 3B except for an inversion
along the vertical axis. In Figure 4, these two patterns of results are shown next to each other
using an inverted axis for the magic ratings. As can be seen by comparing the two figures,
there are indeed some similarities, but there are also differences. A common feature (that is
also documented by the statistical analyses in Tables 4 and 6) is that the AR tricks change
more than the two other kinds of tricks from Presentation 1 to Presentation 2. A further
common feature is that the overall average is higher for the AR tricks than for the two other
categories of tricks. A difference that is apparent by comparing the two plots, however, is
that the direction of the difference between the tricks based on the illusion of absence and
those based on amodal completion is reversed. This contradiction is not necessarily as bla-
tant as it may seem, though, given that the statistical evidence suggests that the observed
differences in solution scores may be spurious (Bayes factors less than 1, see Table 3, bottom
row). A further notable difference is that the range across which the average magic ratings
vary is rather small (Figure 4B), while the corresponding range for the average solution
scores is quite substantial (Figure 4A).
Figure 5 shows the relationship between solution scores and magic ratings in a different
format. Here, the magic ratings are averaged within each category of trick and across pre-
sentation times but separately for three different types if trials. In the first type of trial (“not
Table 6. Bayes Factors BF10 for Differences in the Change in Magic Ratings From One Presentation to the
Next, for All Three Pairs of Trick Categories.
Comparison
From Presentation
1 to Presentation 2
From Presentation
2 to Presentation 3
AR vs. absence 143.5 0.17
AR vs. completion 37.8 0.14
Absence vs. completion 0.11 0.11










































Figure 4. The average solution scores (A) and the average magic ratings (B) shown next to each other. To
aid comparison, the magic ratings are plotted on an inverted axis, with the lowest possible magic rating (0) on
the top and the highest possible rating (10) on the bottom. AR¼ attentional and reasoning.
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solved”), the participant had not yet solved the trick. In the second type of trial
(“uncertain”), the participant solved the trick in the same trial as the magic rating was
given, but as the magic rating was made at the beginning of the trial, it is uncertain whether
the subject knew the solution while making the rating or not. In the third type of trial
(“solved”), the participant had solved the tricks in the previous trial so that we can be certain
that the participant was aware of the solution when the magic rating was made. We cate-
gorized a trial as solved only when the solution score equaled 1. A curious pattern that
emerges in Figure 5 is that the solved trials do not have lower average magic ratings than the
unsolved trials for all trick categories. Only the AR tricks exhibit this intuitively expected
pattern. Furthermore, even though the AR tricks do exhibit the expected decrease in magic
ratings when the tricks are solved, the average magic rating is far from zero in the trials
where the tricks had already been solved. Note that the unexpected patterns of results
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Figure 5. Average Magic Ratings for Each of the Three Kinds of Tricks, Plotted Separately Depending on
Solution Status. The numbers of observations underlying the averages are printed on the bars. The error bars

























































Figure 6. Histograms of the Magic Ratings for Each of the Three Types of Trick, Plotted Separately for Trials
Where the Trick Was Solved (Top Row) and for Trials Where the Trick Was Not Solved (Bottom Row).
Notice how broad the distributions are, that magic ratings of 0 occurred even when the trick was not solved,
and that magic ratings of 10 occurred even when the trick was solved. AR¼ attentional and reasoning.
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are based on relatively few data points simply because those tricks were infrequently solved
(as already apparent in Figure 2). In Figure 5, the numbers of relevant observations are
plotted on the corresponding bars. Statistical analysis, however, indicate that there is
“substantial” statistical evidence against a dependence on solution status both for the
tricks based on the illusion of absence (BF10¼ 0.15) and for the tricks based on amodal
completion (BF10¼ 0.30). For the AR tricks, on the other hand, there was “decisive” evi-
dence that the magic ratings do depend on the solution status (BF10¼ 2.4eþ 36).
Figure 6 shows the distributions of magic ratings underlying the average values shown in
Figure 5. Note that the distributions are rather broad, meaning that the magic ratings vary
substantially, both when the tricks were solved in given trial and when they were not.
Interestingly, the distributions are even so broad that there were (A) cases where participants
gave a magic rating of 10 even when they correctly solved the trick in the corresponding trial,
as well as (B) cases where the participants gave a magic rating of 0 although they had failed
to solve the trick.
Figure 7 shows the distributions of the average magic rating of each participant (Panel A)
and the average solution score of each participant (Panel B). While the distribution of the
individual average magic rating levels peaks at intermediate values (between 4 and 5), there
are also participants who generally tend to give extremely low (between 0 and 1) or extremely
high (between 9 and 10) magic ratings. The distribution of the individual solution scores, on
the other hand, peaks at a low value (between 0.2 and 0.3), and most of the participants have
an individual solution score well below 0.5. Figure 7C plots the individual average magic
ratings against the individual solution scores. On the descriptive level, there is a small neg-
ative Spearman correlation (r¼.28), but the statistical evidence for a nonzero correlation is
merely “anecdotal” (BF10¼ 1.80). Thus, the individual tendency to give high or low magic
ratings is at best only marginally related to the individual problem-solving performance.
Discussion
Our results show that very few subjects figured out how the magic tricks based on the illusion
of absence and the magic tricks based on amodal completion were done after repeated
presentations, while the majority did so for magic tricks based on attentional and reasoning
misdirection. Such a difference between tricks based on amodal completion and tricks based
on attentional misdirection has already been observed in a previous study (Ekroll, De















































r= −0.28, BF= 1.80
A B C
Figure 7. A: Distribution of participant-specific overall magic ratings (averaged across all tricks and pre-
sentation numbers). B: Distribution of participant-specific overall solution scores. BF¼Bayes factor.
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Bruyckere, et al., 2018). In addition to replicating this previous finding, the present findings
indicate that tricks based on the illusion of absence are similarly robust to repetition as tricks
based on amodal completion. As previously argued by Ekroll, De Bruyckere, et al. (2018),
tricks based on perceptual illusions can be expected to be robust to repetition due to the
robust and persistent nature of perceptual illusions (Firestone & Scholl, 2016; Leslie, 1988;
Pylyshyn, 1999). Thus, the present findings suggest that the mechanisms underlying the
illusion of absence are perceptual in nature, just like those underlying amodal completion
(Ekroll, Mertens, et al., 2018; Ekroll & Wagemans, 2016; Gerbino & Zabai, 2003; Kanizsa,
1985; Michotte et al., 1964; Scherzer & Ekroll, 2015; Shimojo & Nakayama, 1990).
Visual Perception of Occluded Space
It may certainly appear counterintuitive to claim that perceptual or visual mechanisms
determine our experience of regions of space which are occluded from direct view and
hence produce no visual stimulation whatsoever. It is already well known, however, that
perceptual processes mostly do not have direct access to the real-world properties they make
inferences about and instead rely on indirect cues and contextual information (Gilchrist,
2015; Hoffman, 2000; Palmer, 1999). The perceptual experience of three-dimensional depth,
for instance, is certainly not a product of direct sensory stimulation (as the retina is two-
dimensional rather than three-dimensional), but rather a product of indirect cues, higher
order regularities, and contextual information that actually are available in the more global
pattern of sensory stimulation at the retina (Hershenson, 1999). Thus, the claim that visual
mechanisms can determine our experience of occluded regions of space is, in general prin-
ciple, no more radical than the commonly accepted view that our experience of depth is
determined by visual mechanisms. There is certainly contextual information in the stimulus
that sometimes makes it possible to make educated guesses about what may or may not be
hidden behind an occluder, and the interesting empirical question is to what extent and
according to what rules and heuristics the visual system actually uses this information to
make such “educated guesses.” A large body of research on amodal completion already
shows that, although it may appear counterintuitive, the visual system uses such information
to an impressive extent (Ekroll, Mertens, et al., 2018; Ekroll et al., 2017; Gerbino, 2017;
Gerbino & Zabai, 2003; Kanizsa, 1985; Koenderink et al., 2018; Michotte et al., 1964; Peta
et al., 2019; Scherzer & Ekroll, 2015; Shimojo & Nakayama, 1990; Tse, 1999; Van Lier, 1999;
Van Lier & Wagemans, 1999). The present findings suggest in agreement with the findings of
Øhrn et al. (2019) that the visual system also can create a perceptual illusion of absence by
relying on contextual information. Importantly, extant models of amodal completion which
appeal to the notion that visible parts form the basis for some kind of perceptual inter- or
extrapolation of the invisible parts cannot be applied to the illusion of absence because it
does not involve any visible parts. The generic view principle (Albert, 2001; Albert &
Hoffman, 2000), however, seems to furnish a plausible candidate explanation and the results
of Øhrn et al. (2019) provide some preliminary support for this hypothesis. A prediction that
can be derived from this hypothesis is that the illusion of absence should be stronger or more
likely to occur for narrow occluders than wide occluders, which was indeed found in Øhrn
et al.’s study, although the difference was rather small. This hypothesis needs to be tested
further. It would also be desirable to develop alternative candidate explanations for the
illusion of absence.
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Weak Relationship Between Solution Scores and Magic Ratings
Several aspects of our data show that the relationship between the solution scores and the
magic ratings deviate considerably from what one might expect based on the simple notion
that the trick should be rated as magical if and only if the spectator is unaware of the secret
behind it:
1. The overall solution scores for the occlusion tricks (i.e., those based on the illusion of
absence or amodal completion) are much higher than the overall solution scores for the
AR tricks (Figure 2B), while the corresponding difference in overall magic ratings is rather
small (Figure 4B).
2. Relatedly, the difference between the solution scores of the occlusion tricks, on the one
hand, and the AR tricks, on the other hand, increases considerably with repeated pre-
sentations (Figure 2B), but the corresponding difference in magic ratings increase only
marginally (Figure 4B).
3. The average magic ratings were not very different for trials where the participants did not
know the secret behind the trick and trials where they definitely did (Figure 5). Indeed, for
the occlusion tricks, there was “substantial” statistical evidence against a dependence on
solution status.
4. Even for the AR tricks, which exhibited the intuitively expected decrease in magic ratings
for solved trials, the average magic rating in the solved trials was still considerably
above zero.
5. The correlation between the individual general propensities to solve the tricks and the
individual general propensities to give high magic ratings was small (r¼.28, Figure 7)
and only supported by “anecdotal” statistical evidence.
Two general hypotheses may together furnish a plausible account for the rather high
magic ratings in the trials where the participants had already figured out the secret behind
the trick, namely, (a) that the discovery of the secret behind the trick also evokes an expe-
rience of magic and (b) that tricks based on cognitively impenetrable perceptual
illusions may retain a certain residual magical quality even after the secret is known because
perceptual illusion tend to persist even in the face of better knowledge (Ekroll et al., 2017;
Ortiz, 2006).
Magical Experiences Evoked by Discovering the Secret Behind a Trick. At first blush, one might be
prone to think that discovering the secret behind a trick is a disenchanting and sobering
experience. Several lines of reasoning, however, suggest that it may actually evoke feelings of
surprise, insight, and perhaps even an illusion of impossibility. Discovering the secret behind
a magic trick often evokes an Aha-experience or experience of insight (Danek, 2018; Danek
& Flanagin, 2019; Danek et al., 2014, 2018). As discussed by Topolinski and Reber (2010),
two of the main characteristics of insight are that the “solution of the problem pops into
mind abruptly and surprisingly” (p. 402) and that the insight “yields a genuine positive
affective experience” (p. 402). Surprise is rated as one of the more favored aspects of
magic tricks (Gronchi et al., 2017; Jay, 2016). Thus, the rather high magic ratings made
by the participants in our study after they had discovered the secret may reflect the surprise
they experienced when realizing how simple the secrets behind the originally rather impres-
sive magic tricks turned out to be. Furthermore, it may be that discovering the secret behind
a magic trick actually evokes a magical experience in the sense that it leads to an illusion of
impossibility (Aronson, 2013). In many magic tricks, the secret is so simple and blatantly
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obvious in retrospect, that once the spectator knows the secret, they may find it incompre-
hensible how they could be fooled by the trick in the first place. A key reason why it may be
difficult to understand why one is so easily fooled by many magic tricks is that they are based
on systematic failures in visual metacognition (Ekroll, 2019; Ekroll et al., 2017; Kuhn, 2019;
Kuhn et al., 2014; Ortega et al., 2018). These failures of metacognition are highly counter-
intuitive and have consequences that may appear impossible (for instance, that you failed to
notice something that happened right in front of your eyes or that your brain made you
“hallucinate” missing pieces of an object). The broad public appeal of phenomena like
change blindness may stem from the fact that they involve highly counterintuitive and sur-
prising failures of visual metacognition (Simons & Rensink, 2005; Levin, 2002). Thus, one
might speculate that both demonstrations of change blindness and discovering the secret
behind magic tricks may evoke magical experiences for essentially the same reason: The
associated failures of visual metacognition have consequences that appear impossible.
Residual Magical Qualities of Magic Tricks Based on Perceptual Illusions. As pointed out by Ekroll
et al. (2017), tricks based on visual illusions may be expected to retain a residual “magical
quality” (p. 94) even after the secret has become known. Although the spectator knows that
what happens is not really impossible, it still looks like something impossible happens
because the underlying visual illusion persists in spite of better knowledge (Firestone &
Scholl, 2016; Kanizsa, 1985; Leslie, 1988).
On their own, neither of the two above hypotheses can explain the observed pattern of
results, but together they furnish a plausible account. The hypothesis that discovering the
secret behind a trick can evoke a magical experience explain why the magic ratings are
relatively high after discovery of the secret for all three types of tricks (Figure 5), and the
hypothesis that tricks based on perceptual illusions lead to a residual magical quality even
after discovery of the secret can explain why the magic ratings after discovery tend to be
somewhat higher for the tricks based on amodal completion and the illusion of absence
(Figure 5). The former hypothesis is entirely ad hoc, but we think is theoretically interesting
and warrants further investigation.
Criteria for Having Discovered the Secret(s) Behind a Magic Trick
One challenge we faced in this study was how to best rate whether the participants had solved
the magic tricks or not. As mentioned, the responses were initially scored on a 4-point rating
scale, similar to that used by earlier studies in which magic tricks were used as insight
problems (Hedne et al., 2016). In our case, this way of determining the accuracy of the
responses gave a surprisingly low interrater agreement (70%). In the Hedne et al.’s (2016)
study, both raters were professional magicians with a deep understanding of the workings
behind the tricks, while in this study, only one of the raters had experience with performing
magic. This might suggest that using atheoretical ratings as a measure of insight into the
secret behind magic tricks requires raters with a relatively deep knowledge of the magic
techniques used in the tricks. In hindsight, we should have selected only tricks with a
single theoretically relevant solution criterion. Such tricks would presumably be easier to
rate, especially for naive raters without any prior knowledge of magic.
A limitation of the web-based survey application we used was that it did not let us control
how many times each participant viewed the videos, apart from instructing them not to.
Thus, we cannot rule out that some participants may have seen the tricks more times than
intended. If this happened it may have given us some false positives.
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All the magic tricks used in the illusion of absence category relied on the magic technique
of palming (de Ascanio, 1964/2005), which is a collective term for sleight of hand techniques
involving secretly hiding an object in an apparently empty hand. The technique is used in a
variety of magic tricks in order to create the illusion that objects magically appear or dis-
appear. Our results indicate that the illusion of absence is indeed a perceptual illusion, and it
appears likely that this perceptual illusion plays a pivotal role in making palming such a
powerful magical technique. An interesting informal observation we made when selecting
tricks for this study was that we found it rather difficult to find tricks for the amodal com-
pletion and AR categories that did not involve a potential additional contribution of the
illusion of absence due to palming or other secret moves where objects are completely
hidden. This suggest that the illusion of absence might play a very pervasive role in magic
and thus be a key perceptual process in the magician’s toolbox.
Conclusions
In agreement with the findings of Øhrn et al. (2019), the present results lend further support
to the hypothesis that the illusion of absence is based on cognitively impenetrable perceptual
mechanisms in much the same way as classical amodal completion. Our findings also suggest
that there may be two magical moments in the lifetime of a magic trick: In addition to the
magical experience evoked by trick itself, discovering the secret behind the trick may also
evoke an experience of impossibility. The latter hypothesis is ad hoc but appears well worth
pursuing in further research.
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Appendix A: General Information About the Study Given to the
Participants at the Beginning of the Experiment (English
Translation of the Norwegian Original)
Welcome. Thank you for participating in this experiment. You are about to watch some
magic tricks. You will rate how magical you think they are on a scale of 0 to 10. You shall
also enter how you think the magician did the trick. The purpose of the study is to study how
visual processes play a role in magic tricks. Participation is voluntary and you can withdraw
at any time during the survey. Your participation is anonymous. The study is conducted at
the University of Bergen. The responsible for the study are Prof. Vebjørn Ekroll at the
Department of Social Psychology, Vebjorn.Ekroll@uib.no, and Mats Svalebjørg,
msv009@student.uib.no. The project is approved by the Norwegian Centre for Research
Data. As I click “next,” I confirm I have read and understood this text and give my consent
for participation.
Appendix B: Criteria for Coding the Solutions (English Translation
of the Norwegian Original)
The following is an overview of the solutions of the magic tricks used in the study and the
criteria the solution was scored by. The magic tricks vary in complexity, where some tricks
only have one criterion for a complete solution, while others have multiple criterions.
Amodal Absence
Absence 1: Production of Jumbo Coin From Purse. This magic trick is done by the coin being hidden
at first in the left hand behind the purse when the right hand is displayed being empty. Then
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the coin is then transferred along with the purse to the right hand as the left hand is displayed
being empty. The left hand grabs the purse and the right hand that now conceals the coin
simulates taking the coin out of the purse.
There are four key criteria in the magic trick:
The coin was in the left hand.
The coin was in the right hand.
The coin was transferred with the wallet.
The simulation of taking the coin out from the purse.
Absence 2: Disappearing Cigarette. This magic trick is done by having the cigarette being secret-
ly transferred to the left hand after it apparently is being pushed into the right hand. In the
left hand, it is kept hidden between the middle finger and the palm of the hand, going parallel
to the middle finger.
If the participant describes where the cigarette ends up, the trick is scored as being solved.
Absence 3: Vanishing Cards. In this magic trick, the cards that are apparently being dealt out of
the right hand is collected in the hand as they «vanish». All cards are collected in a pile in the
right hand during the deal before they are dropped into the lap at the end.
If the participant understands that the cards are collected together in the hand, they have
solved the trick.
Amodal Completion
Completion 1: Rope Trick. This trick is done using two ropes, a short and a long rope. First, the
two ropes are shown as one rope. When the ends are picked up with the right hand, both
ends of the long rope are caught in the left hand while both ends of the short rope are visible.
Then, the magician simulates taking the ends off the rope. Then, it is simulated that the long
rope is a closed loop. Finally, the little rope is thrown back and one of the ends of the long
rope is released as the magician catches one end of the short rope, again showing the two
ropes as one.
There are three key criteria in the trick:
The two ropes are held together as one in the beginning.
The long rope is shown as a closed loop.
The short rope goes back to the long rope, reaching the starting position.
Completion 2: Pencil Through Banknote. This trick is done with an extra piece of plastic on the
pencil. This piece achieves the illusion that the pencil is inside the banknote while it’s really
behind.
If the participant describes something that enables this illusion, the trick is solved.
Completion 3: Linking Rings. In this trick a closed metal ring and a metal ring with an opening
are used. The ring in the left hand is the one with the opening. When the rings are shown as
whole, the fingers on the left hand covers the opening the whole time. The rings are then
hooked together. If the participant describes that there is an opening that is always concealed
the trick is solved.
There are three criteria for judging this:
One ring has an opening.
The opening is constant, there is no hidden mechanisms that opens up temporarily.
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The opening is hidden in the hands.
Attentional and Reasoning Misdirection
AR 1: Disappearing Ball. This magic trick is done by dropping one ball behind the table when
the two balls are apparently put together.
If the participant describes that the ball is dropped behind the table, the trick is solved.
AR 2: Coin Under Card. This trick is done by flicking the coin under the card when it simulated
that the coin is picked up by the left hand.
If the participant describes that the coins are pushed under the card at that moment, they
have solved the trick.
AR 3: Vanishing Cigarette and Lighter. This trick is done by dropping both the cigarette and the
lighter openly behind the table.
There are two key criteria in the magic trick:
The dropping of the cigarette.
The dropping of the lighter.
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